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Abstract: While the use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by media development 
implementers is well documented, organizations’ coping strategies to adapt to new environments in 
media and development still remain a relatively unexplored area. The article aims at showing how 
the theoretical lessons learnt by the industry have been put into practice and how a successful 
change can be driven within an organization using outside experts. 
A results-oriented culture of performance and service has been enforced since the 1990s in the EU. 
Evaluation systems have been a powerful catalyst in driving the transition from media support to 
media development and in making the latter more independent from broadcasters and donors. In 
recent years, changes in media assistance procedures and aims have profoundly modified the 
traditional landscape. This article will not question these changes, their origin and motivations. It 
will focus on implementers’ coping strategies to adapt (or not) to these new procedures and aims 
and how results-oriented evaluations can drive the shift from outputs to outcomes in a changing 
media development sector. 
Can capitalizing on experience be considered a learning process that prepares for change and 
improves the design and implementation of projects? To what extent can it help to empower the 
operator as an organization? Referring to various concrete case studies from British, French and 
German media assistance, the article will focus on virtuous change – the circumstances that 
encourage structures, as well as donors who fund them, to better define and operationalize their 
strategies.  
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this essay is to demonstrate the lessons learned within the media 
development sector and to show how this theoretical knowledge has been put into 
practice by Europe’s main operators. Previous studies have so far concentrated on 
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major donor perspectives and challenges within monitoring and evaluation, blind 
spots in donor activities and to what extent donors incorporate monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) into their funding decisions. The use of M&E by media 
development implementers is well documented but the organizations’ coping 
strategies to adapt to new environments in both media and development still 
remain a relatively unexplored area. The issue involves management just as much 
as it does government strategy and international support: What do we mean by 
change? What aspects make up the shared assessment and what aspects cause 
controversy? And beyond these observations, how do you drive successful change 
within an organization using outside experts? 
 
First conceived in the United States during the 1970s, Public Policy Evaluation was 
a spin-off from New Public Management, and has since been practised in Europe 
through the European Commission. In the 1990s, it became a compulsory element 
for all projects receiving European funding. 
However, a results-oriented culture or at least a greater orientation towards a 
culture of performance and service, has been enforced to varying extents 
throughout the different EU member states (Lamarzelle 2008), with the UK and 
Scandinavian countries being the first to incorporate it into their government 
reforms. 
In a communication from 2000, the Commission defines Evaluation as being a 
“judgement of interventions according to their results, impacts and needs they aim 
to satisfy”1. More recently2, it is described as being part of a system as a whole, as 
“Smart Regulation”, which explicitly aims at eliminating “unnecessary costs and 
[identifying] areas for performance improvement […] across all EU legislation” in 
order to finally “improve conditions for European citizens and businesses and 
contribute to the EU's global role”. 
The system implied by “smart regulation” offers a double advantage for the media 
development sector: on the one hand, in terms of strategic management, it sets 
performance as a priority and makes operators accountable to donors (and to tax-
payers) and on the other hand, in terms of implementation, it promotes the 
outsourcing of public activity to competing service providers. 
In France for example, Canal France International is the preferred operator of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development for media assistance 
and receives roughly 12 million euros per year to implement a three-year 
government contract. Bodies that receive state funding must abide by a certain 
number of conditions: in the Netherlands, Free Press Unlimited receives a five-
year investment from the Dutch Foreign Affairs ministry. This credit line, MFS-II, 
covers the period of 2011-2015. But the recipient is required to derive a minimum 
of 25% of its income from its own fundraising. 
 
                                                 
1 Communication “Focus on Results: Strengthening Evaluation of Community Activities”, SEC 
(2000) 1051. 
2 A second communication has been released in 2007: “Responding to Strategic Needs: Reinforcing 
the use of Evaluation”, SEC (2007) 0213 and a third one in 2013: “Strengthening the foundations of 
Smart Regulation – improving evaluation”, COM (2013) 686. 
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The development aid sector assimilated this results-oriented culture very early on. 
Its principles were incorporated into the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
as early as 1991 (OECD 2010). At the time, OECD key standards stated that “an 
important purpose of evaluation is to bring to the attention of policy-makers 
constraints on developmental aid success resulting from policy shortcomings or 
rigidities both on the donor and recipient side, inadequate co-ordination, and the 
effectiveness of other practices, such as procurement”. The evaluation criteria of 
the DAC soon provided a common set of guidelines for the entire sector: 
 
 Relevance: “The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities 
and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.” 
 Effectiveness: “A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its 
objectives.” 
 Efficiency: “Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – 
in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which is used to assess the 
extent to which aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to 
achieve the desired results.” 
 Impact: “The positive and negative changes produced by a development 
intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves 
the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, 
economic, environmental and other development indicators.” 
 Sustainability: “Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the 
benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been 
withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially 
sustainable.”3 
 
The way evaluation has recently spread throughout the development sector 
suggests that if these learning processes can be summarised and consolidated then 
the trend towards greater emphasis on evaluation can have a positive effect on the 
sector, pushing it towards continuous improvement and, in the best case scenario, 
greater professionalization. 
 
Yet, this virtuous approach is not easy to put into practice nor does it have 
consensus: some people choose to carry out evaluation out of peer pressure, 
without expecting much from it, or sometimes people use its recommendations as 
a convenient smokescreen to maintain the status quo. 
The culture of accountability also represents a major policy shift for a relatively 
young industry – most companies specialised in media assistance were set up in 
the 1990s or early 2000s – which for a long time has focused predominantly on the 
volume of assistance rather than on results. 
                                                 
3 The term “sustainability” has a double meaning in French, and refers to sustainability and 
viability, which underscores the weight of intercultural dialogue in the appropriation of concepts 
and also in how they are used. 
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There is little academic research4 to explain the reasons for this transformation. 
Here we will focus only on some of the most relevant milestones, using empirical 
evidence. As it is frequently referred to in French organizational sociology, we will 
use the “Five Stages of Grief” model by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (1969). This 
theoretical framework sequences change such as impending grief or catastrophic 
loss, from denial to anger, bargaining, depression and finally acceptance. We must 
make it clear here that these five steps are only used as a heuristic tool to assess 
coping strategies and not at all as a way to resolve the controversy of their use in 
the social sphere – which is beyond the scope of this study.  
As used in social psychology5 (Duck 2002; Malarewicz 2011) and suggested by 
Kübler-Ross herself6, this framework will help to illustrate a system’s capacity for 
reform, whether this change is initiated from within or by external impulses. 
Operators today place a big emphasis on “empowerment”: they promote it in a 
know-how transfer strategy to their recipients to make them self-sufficient. But to 
what extent are they actually able to empower themselves as operators? 
 
 
1. Denial: Clinging on to a by-gone model 
 
Faced with impending loss, one feels fear, anger, depression and disillusionment. 
In the media world, the digital revolution has been the main type of trauma these 
past few years. Anyone who has assisted the media in trying to control and/or 
manage this new culture has seen the extent of resistance from the “analog” 
environment. 
Today, within some media organizations, whether they are “pure play” like Pro 
Publica or traditional outlets like The New York Times, applications allow editors 
to track the impact of articles, by using data collected online to identify how a story 
grabs a reader’s attention, and whether it produces a quantifiable change. It thus 
seems that media impact can be (at least partially) measured. 
 
According to journalist Derek Thomson, it is vital that digital news organizations 
track which articles are being read to teach news-makers what their audience is 
interested in – and also to teach the audience themselves what they are interested 
in: “The analytic age of journalism has its detractors, but with regard to serving our 
audience, it gets us closer than ever to that highest purpose of journalism: learning 
the ugly truth” (Thomson 2014). 
New profiles combining several skills have emerged, like Brian Abelson, author of 
a study on the correlation between the promotion of online articles in The New 
York Times and their visibility (Abelson 2013), who refers to himself on his blog as 
“Statistician, Journalist, Hacker.” 
 
                                                 
4 See also the attempts made by Ellen Hume and the Knight Foundation in Media Missionaries of 
2004, in a North American Perspective, http://bit.ly/1qGsPAz. 
5 See Miguel Membrado’s “learning curve”. 
6 See Death Is of Vital Importance, where she explains her model “applies to any significant change 
as well”. 
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In an upcoming study, Anya Schiffrin (forthcoming) traces a parallel between the 
use of statistics in the media world and those in the media development world. She 
examines the attempt of media impact trackers  
 
“to trace the ripple effect of news reporting, how to use quantitative data as well as 
qualitative data, what new tools should be developed, and whether it’s possible to reach 
broad agreement as to what kind of impact is desirable and what the role of media outlets 
should be.” 
 
Among US news-makers and organizations involved in deciding on a set of best 
practices and standard tools are Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, The Tow Center 
at Columbia Unversity’s Graduate School of Journalism, Brian Abelson at The New 
York Times, the World Bank, the Knight Foundation, Pew Research Center, 
Annenberg School of Communications, the Nieman Journalism Lab at Harvard 
and the MIT Civic Media Center/Berkman Center’s Media Cloud. 
 
Schiffrin quotes Micha Byruk, from DataKind, a New York-based nonprofit 
organization that helps mission-driven organizations understand data:  
 
“The position of grant officers in foundations is going to be a lot more data-centric because 
of the prevalence of data. Grant officers will need to have much more of a grasp of statistics 
and also an understanding of data management.” 
 
This gap between the new and old world is found within organizations whose 
primary aim is to develop the media. Many of the least digitally literate proved 
they were incapable of generating new ideas, encouraging innovation and 
stimulating public debate. 
 
Founded in 1986, the Panos network began entrusting studies on Scandinavian 
development programs to journalists of their recipient countries. Its founder, Jon 
Tinker described it as “voices of the South examine the problems of the South”. 
In the late 1980s, it pioneered the first major conference on the social and 
economic consequences of HIV on development. Panos then published the first in 
a series of renowned booklets on the effects of stigmatization (Deane, Hanefeld & 
Scalway 2003). Thirty years later however, the network was forced to end its global 
campaign against AIDS, the Global AIDS Program (Le Breton 2012). As assessed 
by different external evaluators, this was due to a failure to adapt to competition 
from organizations capable of mobilizing mass communication and advocacy 
campaigns, thanks to social networks, mobiles and new technology (Glover & 
Leroy 2013). 
 
But it is not just the digital divide that has profoundly affected Panos but also the 
way it sees itself as an operator. A former head of Panos London who asked to 
remain anonymous curtly summarizes:  
 
“Whether you want it or not, your relationship with donors can no longer be based on 
funding requests but on contents. It’s the only way to have a program-based approach in a 
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hostile environment.”7  
 
It is this program-based approach – with all the implications noted above – that 
represents the main turning point within the sector in the 2000s. 
As Anne Nelson sums up,  
 
“a lot of media development funding has been based on the concept of a free press in a 
democracy that has been rooted in Western newspaper culture in the 19th and 20th 
century. This model has been disrupted by the double tsunami of new media technology 
and economic shifts” (Susman-Peña 2012). 
 
When applied through the lens of organizational strategy, this stage of denial 
corresponds to the phase of misunderstanding. A risky phase if ever there was one, 
since it requires a level of awareness in order to bounce back, put an end to 
inefficiency and reject failure. 
 
2. Anger: Moving from media support to media development  
 
The second phase of the bereavement process is characterized by a feeling of anger 
over the loss, which sparks soul-searching. Some media development work that 
was carried out in Palestine about 20 years ago by European donors, notably the 
French, can be taken as a symbolic case in point. As a result of the Oslo Accords in 
the mid-1990s, the Palestinian Authority was in a position to build its own state 
and looked to the international community for assistance. And one of its main 
priorities, even before currency, education or water projects, was the creation of a 
broadcasting organization ex nihilo.8 
The € 25 million initial investment was split between France, Germany, Denmark, 
the European Union and Unesco, but it was the French public broadcaster, France 
Télévisions, who was first in line to provide Yasser Arafat, the first president of the 
Palestinian National Authority, with the equipment necessary to set up his studios. 
The former director of France 2, Pascal Josèphe, had already drawn up a 
provisional program schedule. And on July 2nd 1994, the Palestinian Broadcasting 
Corporation was established. Its studios were a gift of huge geopolitical 
importance but they did not even last ten years: on the 21st February 2002, Israeli 
tanks invaded the channel’s two-storey building, and burnt its two radio stations, 
TV studio and all its audio-visual archives, to ashes. The damage, which 
nevertheless did not kill PBC, cost roughly 3 million euros9. 
 
It was not the first time equipment donated as part of development assistance has 
been destroyed. But if we ignore the political aspect10, the symbolic value was, this 
time, hugely important, because it questioned the very effectiveness of assistance. 
In 1999, French aid had been suspended: the Foreign Ministry complained that the 
                                                 
7 Interview with the author, May 2013. 
8 The agreement emphasized the importance of TV’s role in stability and a comprehensive peace. 
9 Between 2001-2002, Le Monde diplomatique evaluated the total damage caused by Israeli attacks 
to EU-funded development projects at € 17.3 million, http://bit.ly/1z6Rr89.  
10 The link between the attack and PBC’s coverage of news remains unclear. 
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PBC relied too heavily on Arafat’s cabinet without establishing proper instruments 
such as internal rules, a board of directors or a single broadcasting law. 
The episode illustrates in any case the turning point that is underway – still 
relative, complex and contradictory at this stage – which reflects a shift towards 
more structural investment choices: soon we will move from a policy of media 
support (where modernization is seen as an end in itself) to media development, 
where we will look for ways of facilitating an inclusive public debate and economic 
development. 
 
The lessons learned from this incident will have repercussions that will be felt for 
years to come. It is not merely a question of needing to be more prudent or 
clairvoyant – two qualities difficult to conjure up in such conditions – but rather a 
question of applying a skills-transfer mindset to technology-transfer projects so 
that the success (or failure) of a project is measured according to the final benefits 
for the recipients and a theory of change. For Iginio Gagliardone,  
 
“academics and M&E experts lamented the lack of clarity among donors and implementers 
about the specific changes they hoped to achieve through a media intervention. There is a 
tendency to assume that the use of the media can promote professionalism or diffuse 
tensions, but these processes are often too broad to be adequately measured. In order to 
improve evaluation, it is important to have theories explaining in greater detail why certain 
activities are undertaken and to reach which goals” (Gagliardone 2010). 
 
What the incident in Palestine also reveals is the importance of setting up a 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism that can measure not only the effects of the 
project but also the external risks attached to it: all the political, economic and 
social factors… which may hinder the desired outcome and whose early 
identification allows us to imagine the appropriate corrective measures. This risk 
matrix is often incorporated in media development projects despite the fact that 
there are examples like the German or French ministries of foreign affairs that 
continue to support media projects with no such risk matrices to rely on. 
 
The lesson was learnt a few years later, in the Serbia of Slobodan Milošević, when 
France donated a clandestine printing press to local newspapers. The project cost 
nearly $4 million and ran a high risk of being seized by legal authorities. The 
machine, measuring 30 meters long and weighing 730 tons was purchased abroad, 
then shipped to Serbia on 45 trucks, and installed at a suitable site while remaining 
relatively easy to access by various different media outlets. 
Risk identification and solutions to reduce them, meant focus was shifted onto the 
project’s recipients: it was essential to find the most relevant local partners11 and 
team members to ensure smooth operation guaranteeing fairness. Finally, 
implementation took more than three years12: Slobodan Milošević had already left 
office and his regime was overthrown when the printing press was inaugurated in 
                                                 
11 Three daily and nine weekly newspapers and magazines. 
12 The project was launched after the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija, publisher of the Dnevni Telegraf 
daily and the Evropljanin magazine, on Easter Sunday, April 11, 1999. 
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September 2003. 
 
For Corinne Matras, head of journalism at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
from 2000 to 2006 and now a free-lance consultant, promoting an evaluation 
culture has been a gradual process:  
 
“At the start of 2000, Evaluation was used on only a few major multi-year projects. It was 
conducted generally internally, without a specific directive or real background of project 
design. We could see that some equipment delivered was inadequate, with parts “missing” 
or simply too big but that was all part of the “risks”. It’s mainly budget restraints that have 
pushed organizations into seeking impact assessment. The evaluative approach rebalances 
the flow of information from recipients in the South towards the North, whereas the 
dominant model still has the North instructing the South. Despite strong institutional 
resistance, European procedures have gradually become the norm.”  
 
In France, the requirement of assessment first affected associations and NGOs 
which received matching funds from the state to set up projects mainly funded by 
the European Commission. State-owned organizations at the time were not really 
encouraged to learn from this experience, whereas NGOs got off to a flying start. 
In terms of “Corporate Change”, this led to a revival of inertia, which sometimes 
postponed behaviour-change requirements and eventually shifted change towards 
an urgent – even emergency – requirement. 
 
3. Bargaining: (Slowly) Opening up to competition 
 
The shift from media support to media development has been accompanied by a 
greater consideration for the project-based approach, with a greater focus on the 
outcomes of the project rather than the outputs. As Shanthi Kalathil puts it,  
 
“output-based reporting is primarily used to satisfy donor requirements for quantifiable 
ways to describe how money was allocated. The next level of evaluation is the outcome 
level. An outcome is a higher level of result than mere output; it might attempt to describe 
the overall result of a training program on the professional capacity of journalists in the 
region” (Kalathil 2010). 
  
Programmes by BBC Media Action, which are funded by the Global Grant of the 
British Government’s Department for International Development (DfID), are thus 
subject to annual reviews which assess on the one hand a “detailed output scoring” 
and on the other hand “results and value for money”. The grades are divided into 
five subgroups, with A++ constituting the top end of the scale (“outputs 
substantially exceeded expectation” and C referring to the bottom end of the scale 
(“outputs substantially did not meet expectation”). One essential detail is that the 
results are discussed and agreed with senior staff and management at both the 
implementer and donor levels.  
 
Verifying the outcomes however is slightly trickier. In its annual Global Grant 
reviews, BBC Media Action has to assess the “uptake of evidence and analysis on 
media and communications by key development partners resulting from [its] 
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activities”13. An outcome score is calculated out of surveys and interviews by an 
external agency with senior policy and development actors. Among collected data 
are the “use of BBC Media Action research by the policy community”, the “use of 
BBC Media Action research by practitioners” or the “usefulness of BBC Media 
Action research”: 
 
“Answering these types of questions may require survey research work (a budget for which 
must be built in to the program) or an independent assessment team to conduct a 
qualitative evaluation of the project. The assessment team, or whoever is doing the 
evaluation, might gather information on a number of different indicators to determine 
program impact. Sometimes proxy indicators are used if it is impossible to gather the data 
needed. For instance, counting the number of defamation cases lodged by the government 
against journalists from year to year could help paint a picture of the enabling 
environment.” (Kalathil 2010) 
 
From the donor’s point of view, consideration of outcomes focuses attention on the 
methodology of different operators to attain objectives, and hence focuses 
attention on the best-adapted research tools. This therefore creates a supply policy, 
expressed through competition between operators to answer calls for proposals, 
and where promises must be explained and substantiated. The degree of openness 
to competition – sometimes very relative in France or Germany for example – is 
the bargaining stage in the process of mourning: by pretending to ignore that a 
new model has arrived, stakeholders concoct small deals to try and negotiate the 
least painful changes whilst trying to maintain the current system where a 
domestic privileged player is seen as the least threatening status quo.  
This temptation to go for trade-offs is not very common in the media development 
sector, due to the low number of media development actors. Nevertheless, one can 
find traces in the longstanding practice of in-kind exchange of training sessions in 
return for new frequencies allocated to international broadcasters. Far from being 
project-based, this form of incentive had little chance of fostering 
professionalization.  
However, this bargaining trend has caught on among some operators’ staff as well, 
who have put up resistance to the development assistance model, as will be 
described later on. 
 
More broadly, if public development aid in Europe is stalling, it is definitely not the 
case in the media development sphere, even if no combined data is yet available. 
As the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development report showed 
(Concord 2013), many Concord members noted that, in recent years, their 
government’s commitment to the Paris and Accra principles14 such as country 
ownership had weakened and only seven EU member states have a full strategy in 
                                                 
13 Indicator 4 of the programme’s log-frame. 
14 At the 2005 Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, it was recognized that assistance 
should be producing better impacts. The Paris Declaration is formulated around five principles: 
Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability. In 2008, 
the Accra Agenda for Action was endorsed, calling for greater and more inclusive partnerships. 
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place for implementing the Busan commitments15. In 2012, aid from the EU-27 
countries represented only 0.39% of the EU’s GNI, bringing us back to the lowest 
level since 2007. 
 
Figure 1: For most European implementers, room for growth resides beyond 
funding from their main donor 
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Main donor’s contributions (dotted lines) do not mean all national funding to the implementer (the 
continuous lines in the same colour) but only their main source. Sources: DW Akademie, Canal 
France International, Free Press Unlimited, IMS.  
 
 
The study of operators’ annual budgets totaling between 10 and 20 million euros 
(figure 1) reflects the increased competition that took place during the early 2010s 
and the volatile market: those that were developing rapidly (Deutsche Welle 
Akademie and Free Press Unlimited particularly) went to find new sources of 
funding elsewhere, thus reducing their dependence vis-à-vis their main donors, 
whose commitment stalled or fell. 
With regards to Germany, the increase in assistance from BMZ, the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, at the end of the period is 
misleading because in March 2013 the Ministry became the preferred channel for 
federal funds, while at the start of the period, a multitude of donors and agencies 
were favored. However, the Deutsche Welle Akademie, saw its budget increase by 
70% in three years thanks to European projects. The Danish IMS remained steady 
                                                 
15 The 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation insists on the inclusion of 
new actors to “strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of adversity”. 
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at the end of the period while the French copied the trend of reducing state 
funding. 
With the exception of BBC Media Action, which grew enormously when it was 
awarded a “Global Grant” from DfID, weaning off from the main donor appears to 
be the key to growth, and this has happened regardless of the global volume of 
activity: larger structures are not the most dependent (BBC Media Action relies on 
DfID for 40%, DW Akademie on the German federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development for 51%), nor are the smaller ones the most 
independent (IMS: 54%, FPU: 69% and CFI: 89%). 
 
At national level, the presence of a competitor to the main operator creates healthy 
competition. This is the case for the German organization Media in Cooperation 
and Transition (MICT), a non-profit which specializes in the Middle East and 
North Africa or for France Médias Monde (RFI Planète Radio and Académie 
FMM) and prominent jounalism-schools in France, to quote just a few examples. 
When this is not the case, competition takes place at the European level. In 
Denmark, for example, competitive bidding for public funds has led some 
departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give priority to BBC Media 
Action over the Danish operator, IMS, for geographic-specific interventions. 
 
Even in France, renowned for being one of the most reluctant countries along with 
Germany to open up the sector, several of its credit lines have gone to international 
operators like the Swiss Fondation Hirondelle or even the US-based Search for 
Common Ground, which received public funds in 2010, at the expense of the 
French operators. The overall amount of French foreign assistance funding 
allocated to non-state actors and state broadcasters for media development 
activities is not made public but it can be estimated at more than €5 million 
annually in the last five years. 
 
Competition is growing. It is clear that the changes impacting European media 
development operators are based primarily on this external factor and on reducing 
their dependence on their main donors. Operators emphasize a growing consensus 
towards a single project culture and a desire for professionalism in order to 
stimulate their own development. Those operators that have the flexibility and the 
capacity to adapt to the new climate are the ones that will be the most successful. 
 
4. Depression: Soft convergence 
 
The phase of depression can be seen as a moment of release: if future 
developments seem irreversible, why fight them? Although they have not yet 
accepted the situation, the main players have prepared for it. This consent is not 
really desired but it is not a constraint either. 
In the media development sector, this step also corresponds to a new tendency for 
healthy competition which sets benchmark policies and a common model for 
intervention. 
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The changes, whether they are imposed or chosen, organizational or technological, 
are primarily decided by management. Sometimes managers adopt the forms and 
codes of the industrial sector, particularly the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Adjust) 
model or the Deming wheel. In Germany, Deutsche Welle Akademie has enjoyed 
an international certification for quality management in line with ISO 9001, since 
summer 2010. 
In France, Canal France International called on a firm specialized in “corporate 
change” in 2012, SCA Consult. For the firm’s consultant, Fabrice Plançon,  
 
“change management is a project. Or a component of a project. And on that basis, should 
be carried out as a project. [...] What are the steps, what are the thresholds and what are the 
objectives of each stage, how do you get to the next level and how is it integrated into the 
overall project” (Buchy 2013). 
 
Stanford University is currently conducting research on the evolution of the non-
profit sector, and metrics and evaluation within it. Rationalizing public aid allows 
us to analyse communication at the interface of three social spheres: associations, 
science & management. The Center for Social Innovation explains on its site:  
 
“Our goal is to document the sources and types of non-profit evaluation, and explain how 
the proliferation of evaluation is reshaping organizational behaviour and its broader social 
impacts in the United States and internationally.”16  
 
The first results show that the organizations  
 
“engaged in activities which involve competition or coordination with organizations of a 
different legal form – specifically evaluation, networking and consulting – use more 
interlanguage” (Oelberger et al. 2012),  
 
which can be described as the smallest common denominator that facilitates the 
communication across the three spheres: associations, science and management. 
With regards to European media development, a greater investment in human 
resources within structures has undoubtedly strengthened the professionalization 
of the sector. It has allowed teams to improve their knowledge, skills and 
awareness of constantly-evolving features of an ill-defined sector. 
 
This collective consciousness, to borrow the term from social psychology, is even 
more crucial given that middle management has various backgrounds: more 
academic and journalistic in Germany, rather more associative and journalistic in 
Britain, and more diplomatic in France. 
This intense change management is often endured as a painful experience within 
bodies where media development has been learnt on the job. Groups or individuals 
can try and resist its readjustments by withdrawing, fighting, criticizing or even at 
times sabotaging the operation. 
 
                                                 
16 See http://stanford.io/1mBTyve, as seen on June 27th, 2014. 
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Resilience is tested, as explained in an academic study of Canal France 
International:  
 
“Ability to learn, adapt to changing national and international contexts, endurance capacity 
and initiative, ability to mobilize and work... these intrinsic forces have allowed the 
company to withstand major political upheavals and remain in an increasingly competitive 
sector.” (Buchy 2013: 59) 
 
The development of benchmarks and the generalization of an EU framework 
defining calls for proposals have over-ridden national specificities. The model that 
emerges is designed to be more flexible and more responsive to geopolitical 
uncertainties, as shown in the distribution of its geographical share by BBC Media 
Action from 2010 to 2013. Changes in volume and proportion from one year to the 
next reflect the influence of the operator’s decisions and its capacity for 
responsiveness: Africa climbed from 18% to 28% of BBC Media Action’s overseas 
operations in just three years. After the uprisings in North Africa, non-African and 
non-Asian activities rose 9 points in 2012 but they descended by 14 points a year 
later, when BBC Media Action received its new Global Grant from DfID. However, 
further investigation still remains to be conducted to convey a detailed and 
granular analysis on the links between donor grants and implementer’s agendas. 
 
The consolidation of the sector did the rest: in spring 2011, Free Press Unlimited 
was established from a merger between Free Voice, Press Now and the 
International Projects department of Radio Netherlands Training Centre (RNTC). 
Three years later in France, Gret gave up its media shares and Panos Paris 
significantly reduced its activities. The traditional players were joining forces 
whilst others were disappearing, and this paved the way for newcomers whose 
main niche was advocacy. This phenomenon led to the emergence of new 
membership bodies and consultants alongside NGOs working in the international 
development sector, responsible for advocacy, networking or monitoring and 
evaluation, to “make the development sector work better” as was promised by one 
among them. The main challenge of the sector is, however, its ability to learn from 
past evaluations:  
 
“Monitoring and evaluation of media support interventions has historically been 
considered weak in this sector, but the sector has become increasingly professional in 
recent years and impact assessment methodologies have become increasingly sophisticated 
and effective. However, new evidence suggests that donors overall have not sufficiently 
used findings from evaluations to inform their strategies for support to the media.” (BBC 
World Service Trust 2011)  
 
This is the essence of learning. 
 
5. Acceptance: Learning, a strategic tool for development 
 
The final stage of grieving is acceptance, which presents two options: 
“performance” which consists in continuing with readjustments to reach a new 
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objective, and “demise” which is a laissez-faire approach in the face of death. The 
reality of the loss is better accepted, better understood. In the cycle of change, 
acceptance is divided into two parts: the first phase is “assimilation”, which then 
paves the way for “adoption”. 
Change management is based on three verbs: choose, decide, realize. It highlights 
the practical contribution of the people involved in the creation of the 
programmes. This participatory dimension has the effect of redistributing roles 
within the organization, fostering a horizontal structure unlike the old top-down 
model, and thus encouraging a greater delegation of responsibilities. 
 
In Germany, under the leadership of the division “governance, democracy, rule of 
law, freedom of speech and of the press” of the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Deutsche Welle Akademie has redefined 
its methodological objectives and developed a “development studies” department 
within its organization. 
It is this department that supplies the organization with its choice of priorities for 
intervention, choosing among twenty-five priority countries. The different indexes 
about the state of the media are taken into account but also the potential for 
cooperation with a local partner as well as the probability of a project being 
successfully implemented, using a confidential methodology. 
The implementation of more ambitious development projects, which are not 
limited to the transfer of expertise, has led most major stakeholders to reduce 
specific programs to less than half a dozen and the number of priority countries to 
less than thirty17. 
 
In Denmark every three years, evaluation doubles as a “capacity assessment” of the 
company under evaluation, resulting in recommendations and a response to the 
stakeholders. The last one in 2012, was mainly focused on indicators and on the 
system of monitoring and evaluation, which led IMS to produce a “Comprehensive 
Results-based Management Framework” and to hire a knowledge 
management/M&E expert reporting directly to the CEO. 
The growth of the “Research and Learning” group by BBC Media Action from the 
late 2000s onwards was gradually replicated throughout the whole media 
development industry. Evaluation was no longer perceived as an imposed 
contractual obligation but as an end in itself, a part of a genuine results-based 
management and accountability framework. This new culture of evaluation was 
further strengthened by research on the catalytic effect of media on development –
 or “the Role of Mass Media in Economic Development” (Djankov, Islam & 
McLeish 2002; Roy 2011)18 to use the even more explicit term of a report by the 
World Bank which became a landmark.  
 
Documentation of the impact of media projects remains to this day the blind spot 
                                                 
17 Only France had a “potential” of 92 countries in the same period of time. 
18 The World Development Report 2002, “Building Institutions for Markets” (rep. no. 22825), 
devoted a chapter to the role of the media in development. 
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of quality initiatives in the sector. The largest quantitative study to date is 
currently being conducted in Burkina Faso: A 60-second advertisement is being 
broadcast for 30 months, 10 times a day on seven radio stations in order to reduce 
under-five mortality. Development Media International (DMI) and the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine are running this five-year cluster-
randomised controlled trial. Mid-term results19 appear to demonstrate that mass 
media can cause behaviour change but the results raise more questions than 
answers. Full results with an endline mortality survey of 100,000 children are 
expected by late-2015. 
Yet, despite all this, the learning process has not been fully realized for one main 
reason: the lack of a critical analysis regarding the indicators that measure how 
well operators meet their targets. 
Paradoxically, even though we are witnessing a very rich – and fruitful – 
competitor analysis, what the industry produces in terms of M&E reports are 
rarely made available to a wide public. The growing use of e-governance, however, 
has helped to publicize more and more documents, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon 
world and in Scandinavia where most reviews are available online and 
methodologies can thus be discussed on a scientific basis. 
 
But if debates exist to a certain extent, not all the lessons of past experiments have 
been learnt. A 2010 study by the Catholic Media Council (Cameco) on German 
media development highlighted, for instance, that “German Media Development 
Cooperation appears to be inadequate at strengthening a supportive legal and 
regulatory environment for the media” and it was “also not strong in supporting 
the economic sustainability of media in developing and transitional countries” 
(Dietz 2010). 
The study also revealed that questionnaire based quantitative methods still prevail 
in evaluation practice due to “the lack of readily available impact-oriented methods 
and approaches in media development cooperation” (Ibid.). Two sessions by 
Forum Medien und Entwicklung (Media and Development), a network of media 
assistance actors from the German-speaking countries, moreover, selected 
“Measuring Change” as their main theme in 2007 and 2009 (Jannusch 2007). 
This concern with progress can still be seen in today’s literature on the subject as 
Tara Susman-Peña explains :  
 
“Trying to identify blind spots in media development means that certain critically 
important but already well-considered ‘lessons learned’ will be emphasized less, for 
example: donors’ weak coordination on media interventions, the sustainability of media 
outlets as businesses, the over-abundance of ineffective ‘parachute’ journalism training, 
and the importance of strengthening the enabling environment for media. Even though 
many of these lessons have clearly not sunk in, a broad, high quality discussion of these 
topics already exists” (Susman-Peña 2012). 
 
In one of its latest communications on the subject, the European Commission was 
                                                 
19 “Burkina Faso randomised controlled trial: Midline Results’ executive summary”, Development 
Media International, London 2014, http://bit.ly/V0ZTG8.  
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forced to remind people of evaluation’s inherent critical role:  
 
“Some evaluations don't focus enough on the problems and difficulties encountered – 
which, in a way, are more important than promoting what is working. The main focus of an 
evaluation should be a critical drive to improve performance, which means looking both for 
the bad practices and the good, providing robust and objective evidence to feed decisions as 
to whether EU action should continue as-is, be changed or even stop.”20 
 
Operators and donors continue to fear what they think are the negative effects of 
evaluation, despite various attempts to establish dialogue. Andy Mosher 
concludes:  
 
“The success of some new initiatives, however, depends in large measure on the willingness 
of media assistance organizations to share information about M&E. The past 20 years offer 
little evidence of sharing among groups that have the same goals and methods but often 
compete for the same grants.” (Mosher 2009)  
 
“Coopetition” – the neologism that describes a cooperative competition or a 
competitive cooperation – remains a key feature of the sector. 
The second obstacle to a truly dynamic use for evaluation reports is a 
misunderstanding of some of the basic indicators themselves. For Jonathan Stray,  
 
“metrics are powerful tools for insight and decision-making. But they are not ends in 
themselves because they will never exactly represent what is important. That’s why the first 
step in choosing metrics is to articulate what you want to measure, regardless of whether or 
not there’s an easy way to measure it. Choosing metrics poorly, or misunderstanding their 
limitations, can make things worse. Metrics are just proxies for our real goals — sometimes 
quite poor proxies.” (Stray 2012)  
 
Defined objectives without baseline studies, focus groups conducted on non-
constant measures (i.e. reading groups subjected to a range of different titles for 
example), ‘most significant changes’ which have been identified by the experts and 
do not come from the field, or statistics falling in the margin of error… There are 
many examples of severe biases that call into question the scientific validity of 
results (see Glover et al. 2012). 
Change management fails above all because of this methodological bias. For Eric 
Glover (2012), evaluator and consultant in strategy and change,  
 
“very often evaluation only reveals what the stakeholders already know and do not want to 
hear. Figures from monitoring systems only create the illusion of objectification and as few 
evaluators are worried about measure theory, they quickly end up talking in a vacuum 
without any point.” 
 
Many experts therefore call for an assessment which, although based on a rigorous 
methodology and diligent judgments, would assert individual responsibility or, 
even more daringly, subjectivity, on the part of the assessor. The important thing is 
not to generate more hard data which could open the way for criticism based on 
                                                 
20 “Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation”, COM (2013) 686. 
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the tyranny of evaluation. It is a question of choosing meaningful indicators. For 
Glover (2012),  
 
“in the standard SMART (Specific-Measurable-Assignable-Relevant-Time-bound21), people 
focus more on the R or on the T, whereas they should also pay attention to A: an indicator 
should be the product of dialogue between stakeholders so that everyone knows what is 
going to be measured and why, which may require intercultural mediation, to be sure 
everything is well shared: what is for example, a “good” journalist? Does everyone agree on 
the criteria that need to be established to recognize a “good” journalist?”  
 
This factor has moreover become so important that some authors (see Dwyer & 
Hopwood 2010) nowadays refer to SMARTTA indicators, which stands for 
Trackable and Agreed. 
The change that recipients consider the most significant or the “success stories” 
are qualitative indicators that assume a degree of subjectivity. Donors enjoy them: 
the emotional connection – just like the duration of the working relationship with 
the implementer or the importance of the donor’s positive perception – sometimes 
creates a chain of compassion, which is enough in itself to renew donor support 
without the need for a study on performance and impact. 
 
Not all evaluations are fruitful and following up recommendations is an essential 
stage before they can be put in place. But although a survey’s findings may be 
shared by all the stakeholders, the approval of recommendations which lead to 
actual adjustments often remains the prerogative of top management only. 
Although it is common in the corporate world, the practice of relying on external 
consultants to make recommendations operational remains rare in the field of 
media development. Few operators have been able to manage what Canadians call 
“project lookouts” who work alongside project managers, in a non-hierarchical 
relationship, to validate monitoring tools, identify critical points and recommend 
readjustments. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Consolidating the sector is a fledgling operation. It would be highly optimistic to 
think that all operators have completed each stage of the “5 stage grief” model. 
However, the evaluation system has been a powerful catalyst in driving the 
transition from media support to media development and in making the latter 
more independent from broadcasters and donors. Professionalization is informed 
by a model which ideally inverts the traditional hierarchical structure: The 
evaluative judgment is meant to be informed by evidence from the field and the 
performance of a project is judged only according to the final recipients and a 
theory of change. 
Operators will become more empowered if they build upon development research: 
not the quantity of activity, but the quality of outputs, outcomes and the impact of 
                                                 
21 Nevertheless the latter three criteria have various alternative definitions. 
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the action, which implies reflection and a documented choice of performance 
indicators. 
 
Finally, the approach can be considered virtuous if and only if the lessons learned, 
relevant and substantiated, whether positive or negative, encourage the structures 
as well as the donors who fund them, to define their strategy as well as the 
operationalization of their actions. As Martin Scott summarizes:  
 
“if media development interventions are to be made as effective as possible, it is important 
to fully understand the many choices that need to be made, as well as the implications of 
each decision” (Scott 2014).  
 
To put it another way, this also stresses the need for humanizing data. 
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